London
Deirdre McCloskey certainly leaves an impression. With her robust
frame, hoarse voice interspersed with an occasional stammer, and
extraordinary charisma, she is anything but your typical economic
historian.
On a recent trip to England, she gave a
talk at Hartwell House in the heart of Buckinghamshire that felt like a
good stand-up comedy show, on par with the better performances of Eddie
Izzard or George Carlin. But humor and witticisms aside, the talk
revealed her conviction that economists should not shy away from the
subjects of love, friendship or virtue.
Ms. McCloskey sees a problem in the way that economic models are
dominated by a strange, sociopathic character—"Max U" as she calls him,
referring to the standard economic problem of maximizing utility subject
to various constraints. Her own scholarly work has become increasingly
focused on bringing love, hope, faith, courage and other virtues back
into economics.
Ms. McCloskey enjoyed a stellar career in economic history before her
apostasy, being among the earliest pioneers of cliometrics—the
quantitative study of economic history. In her career as an economic
historian, with appointments at the University of Chicago and the
Institute of Advanced Studies at Princeton, she built and used
historical data sets to answer seemingly arcane questions about the
British steel industry during the 19th century and medieval agriculture.
But then Ms. McCloskey started
crossing boundaries. She became interested in the way economists
formulate their arguments and use persuasion in public discourse. Her
research, questioning some of the fundamental tenets of neoclassical
orthodoxy, was not always met warmly by her colleagues. In the context
of her scholarly transformation, she is fond of quoting Mae West: "I
used to be Snow White, but I drifted."
Terry Shoffner
In the
mid-1990s, Ms. McCloskey went through another radical transformation,
changing her gender and ditching her given first name, Donald, to become
Deirdre. Although many of her colleagues in academia were supportive of
her crossing, that period was difficult for her and her family. Her
children have cut ties with her, and she has never met her 13-year old
grandson. "People throw away love too easily," she told me as we drove
to Hartwell House.
If her talk of ethics sounds fluffy,
recall that in 1759 Adam Smith earned his reputation by publishing "The
Theory of Moral Sentiments," in which he accounted for the emergence of
sympathy and moral judgments. It was only in the 20th century that
ethics disappeared from economics, partly as a result of the increased
mathematization of the discipline. Ms. McCloskey says it was a
fundamental error for economists to start making their arguments in
terms of "Max U" alone. "In fact, 'Max U' would be a much more sensible
person if he had gender change and became 'Maxine U,'" she chuckles.
In 2006, Ms. McCloskey published a 600-page book, "Bourgeois Virtues:
Ethics for an Age of Commerce." In a meticulously documented volume,
drawing from a range of philosophical traditions, she asks whether one
can participate fully in the modern capitalist economy and still be a
moral person. Ms. McCloskey is a free marketeer and used to be a close
personal friend of Milton Friedman, as she eagerly points out. Her
answer is therefore an emphatic yes. It would be ill-advised, she
thinks, to claim that profit-seeking makes one inherently corrupt,
especially if it is balanced by other virtues.
Four years later, she completed a 600-page sequel, "Bourgeois
Dignity: Why Economics Can't Explain the Modern World." "I've forgotten
how to write short books," she says apologetically, adding that she
would like both to be part of a four-volume series on the bourgeois era.
Unlike "Bourgeois Virtues," "Bourgeois Dignity" makes a historical
argument. Modern economic growth, she claims, is a result of an
ideological and rhetorical transformation. In the Elizabethan period,
business was sneered upon. In Shakespeare's plays, the only major
bourgeois character, Antonio, is a fool because of his affection for
Bassanio. There is no need to dwell on how the other bourgeois character
in "The Merchant of Venice," Shylock, is characterized.
She contrasts this with attitudes 200 years later. When James Watt
died in 1819, a statue of him was erected in Westminster Abbey and later
moved to St. Paul's cathedral. This would have been unthinkable two
centuries earlier. In Ms. McCloskey's view, this shift in perceptions
was central to the economic take-off of the West. "A bourgeois deal was
agreed upon," she says. "You let me engage in innovation and creative
destruction, and I will make you rich." A commercial class that was not
ostracized or sneered at was thus able to activate the engine of modern
economic growth.
Ms. McCloskey insists that alternative
explanations for the Industrial Revolution fail, for a variety of
reasons. Property rights, she says, could not have been the principal
cause because England and many other societies had stable and secure
property rights for a long time. Similarly, Atlantic trade and
plundering of the colonies were too insignificant in revenue to have
made the real difference. There had long been much more trade in the
Indian Ocean than in the Atlantic, moreover, and China or India had
never experienced an industrial revolution.
By elimination, Ms. McCloskey concludes that culture and rhetoric are
the only factors that can account for economic change of the magnitude
we have seen in the developed world in past 250 years.
The danger of our era is that the bourgeois deal is slowly crumbling
away. It is under attack from the political left and also from
economists whose work revolves around one sole virtue—prudence—thus
eroding the public understanding of markets and economic life. Looking
at the West's current economic woes, it is easy to share Ms. McCloskey's
concern that unless we revive a sense of dignity and approbation for
entrepreneurship and innovation, we might easily kill the goose that
lays the golden eggs of our prosperity.
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